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What are we talking about when we talk about the “securitization” of international 
migration in Mexico? A critique. 
 
Javier Treviño-Rangel1 
 
Undocumented international migration in Mexico is facing a serious human rights crisis. Each 
year, hundreds of thousands of migrants, above all from Central America, cross Mexico to reach 
the United States. Their journey risks extortion, kidnap, torture, disappearance, and death. For 
activists and civil society organizations, this crisis is explained by what they call the 
“securitization” of Mexico’s migration policy. By “securitization” they understand a policy 
imposed on Mexico by the United States that treats migrants as a security threat. This article 
challenges this interpretation, arguing that the theory of securitization is insufficient to understand 
the many factors that make possible the systematic violence of the human rights of migrants in 
transit in Mexico. KEYWORDS: international migration, human rights, securitization, civil society, 
migratory policy. 
 
In 2010 the corpses of 72 foreign citizens were discovered in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, in 
north-eastern Mexico. The massacre´s only survivor testified that they had been kidnapped 
by members of the local police who then handed them over to the criminal organization Los 
Zetas (an organization created and trained by former members of the Mexican military). 
They had been asked for money in exchange for their freedom, but they had none and so 
were shot in the back.2 From here on, the issue of international migration in Mexico has 
gradually won some recognition in the media. 
It would be hard to say that the San Fernando massacre took the different official 
bodies concerned with the issue by surprise. A year before, the country´s National 
Commission of Human Rights had presented to the public a report documenting how in six 
months more than 9,000 undocumented migrants transiting through to the United States had 
been kidnapped in Mexico.3 Since 2009, the shelters for migrants, journalists and human 
rights activists had also reported the grave abuses they suffer.4 For Jorge A. Bustamante, 
former UN Special Rapporteur on Migrants’ Rights, there is simply “no other country in 
the world where more deaths of international migrants happen” than in Mexico.5 So it is 
that some observers have described the situation of undocumented international migration 
in Mexico as “a holocaust,” “a humanitarian tragedy,” “a human rights crisis.”6 And yet, 
the irregular international migration in transit through Mexico is a problem largely ignored 
by academia. Its absence is especially striking in the international relations (IR) literature, 
despite its being an issue that directly concerns this discipline.7 The reports of activists and 
human rights organizations have covered the academic silence on the matter. 
How have activists and experts tried to explain the human rights crises of migrants 
transiting through Mexico? Reviewing a significant number of documents published on this 
issue in the last years by activists and human rights organizations it is plain that there is a 
certain consensus among the authors on the principal cause supposedly explaining the 
deplorable situation of undocumented international migration: the “securitization” of 
Mexico’s migration policy.8 According to them, the securitization of migration is a 
migratory policy imposed by the United States on Mexico after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
2001. This policy, the authors argue, is based on the belief that undocumented international 
migration is a national security threat, such that the Mexican state has deployed specific 
practices and laws to halt it. 
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Studies on the securitization of migration emerged over twenty years ago and have 
since influenced the discipline of IR.9 These studies have been useful in understanding the 
process through which countries like the United States have adopted more restrictive 
migratory policies and practices with the aim of checking migration. However, as these 
same studies have demonstrated, the process of the securitization of migration in those 
countries has not brought with it a human rights crisis.10 If Mexico is the country where 
more deaths of international migrants happen in the world, the explanation drawn from the 
theory of securitization would appear to be insufficient. If this is so, then what are the 
causes behind the deplorable situation of undocumented migrants in transit through the 
country? What are the factors generating the atrocities perpetrated against them? 
Responding to these questions entails a substantial inquiry, one beyond the reach of 
this article. Furthermore, before trying to give a new answer to these questions, it is 
appropriate to stop and analyze the existing explanation: that is, securitization. Hence this 
article seeks to respond to two questions. First, how is the reality of international migration 
in Mexico explained by those authors who approach it through the concept of 
securitization? Second, what evidence do they have to demonstrate what they say they 
explain? 
Hence the aim of this article is to explore the explanations framed by theories of 
securitization, their use in understanding what is happening with international migration in 
Mexico, and their validity based on the empirical evidence they offer to support what they 
affirm. To do this, this article is divided in four parts. First, I briefly describe the concept of 
securitization. Second, I critically analyze an important number of studies that, framed by 
securitization theories, attempt to explain the situation of international migration in Mexico. 
Third, I scrutinize the evidence used by the studies that talk of the securitization of 
migration in Mexico. There follows a section posing some of the weaknesses of these 
studies. The end offers a conclusion. 
 
 
Conceptual and methodological notes 
Some preliminary conceptual and methodological clarifications are in order. Throughout I 
shall use the categories of activists and experts interchangeably as it is readily found that in 
Mexico academic experts on the migration issue frequently collaborate with civil society 
activists and organizations or are fully one with them. The same happens in reverse: 
academic research is coordinated, edited and published by activists who collaborate in 
research centers and universities. In some cases, these activists and experts furthermore 
participate as state agents. In this sense, as Nicholas Guilhot affirms, these actors are 
“double agents,” serving equally in the fields of the state, academia and the organizations of 
civil society.11 
This inquiry draws on Michel Foucault’s genealogical methods.12 This is an 
interpretive frame that seeks to unsettle the stability of explanations considered fixed, that 
attempts to fragment apparently solid and unified interpretations, and that shows the 
heterogeneity and contingency of events and ideas apparently homogeneous and 
consistent.13 Thus, unlike all the documents consulted here, this article does not take 
securitization as something obvious and evident. Thus too, far from repeating the 
commonplaces of activists and experts, this article seeks to demystify the powerful 
argument that talks of the securitization of migration in Mexico, appearing to easily explain 
what is happening with the undocumented foreign citizens. My aim is to challenge those 
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experts and activists who devoutly repeat that everything that is happening in relation to 
migration is conditioned by securitization. This is no small matter. This article attempts 
nothing less than to dismantle the interpretation that in the last ten years has dominated 
analysis on international migration in Mexico. 
 To select the texts I analyze here I followed the “method for composing our world” 
established by Bruno Latour in his study on the pasteurization of France.14 For Latour, this 
method “does not require us to decide in advance on a list of actors and possible actions. If 
we open the […] literature of the time”, he claims, “we find stories that define for us who 
are the main actors, what happens to them, what trials they undergo.” This method proved 
very useful for this article. It suffices to open any document by some expert or activist for 
this to guide the reader on those texts and actors who have the monopoly on the discourse, 
on the explanations, on what is happening with migration in transit through Mexico. To 
avoid any bias, as may be seen in the footnotes here, there is citation of a large number of 
documents published by diverse organizations and experts, among who are the most 
renowned Mexican migrantologists.  
 Finally, a note on this study´s time limit: the analysis is of texts published by 
activists and experts up until December 2012. The changes since then in migration 
management are not part of this article. 
 
The theory and practice of the securitization of international migration 
In 1995, Ole Waever coined the term securitization in reaction to traditional studies on 
security, to the realist and neo-realist theories of the discipline of IR that restricted the 
concept of “threats” only to dangers of a military type, generally between states.15 For 
Waever, and others like Barry Buzan, it was not sufficient to analyze an apparently 
objective threat. For these authors what mattered was the study of: (a) the process by which 
certain actors, such as the press or the executive, present before the public the existence of 
supposed threats (military or not) as a pretext for deploying certain emergency measures; 
and (b) the results of this process: for example, an increase in the number of police, greater 
resources, more armaments.16 In relation to the migration issue, these authors explored how 
in some countries international migration, with or without documents, went from being an 
issue of ordinary policy to a matter of security, one that demanded greater public attention 
and that legitimized urgent public policies.17 
 The importance of this theoretical focus is that it allowed an understanding of the 
securitization of international migration as a process in which multiple actors—government 
ministers, members of religions, journalists, academics, experts—intervene seeking to 
convince the public that migration is a latent threat to security. And, once migration comes 
to be seen as a danger by the public, these same actors can then justifiably design and 
dispose actions, laws, ad hoc rules, institutions, budgets and emergency mechanisms to end, 
avoid, halt, contain or control the danger—even if these dispositions violate the 
Constitution, international human rights norms, or if they go against common sense. 
 This interpretive frame of securitization won greater salience after the attacks of 
9/11 2001. What occurred that day served—and serves—as a pretext for some states (the 
United States, for instance) to harden their policies vis-à-vis international migration, 
represented as an imminent risk to public security and, above all, to national security. 
 It is important to emphasize that the events of 9/11 have only been an excuse for the 
change in the policies of some countries towards international migration. That is, the link 
between migration and national security was only made to 9/11 in some countries, not in 
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others. In France, for instance, as Philippe Bourbeau has shown, 9/11 had a very limited 
impact. French migration policy is restrictive enough, but the terrorist attacks had very little 
to do with this: that is, there were no significant changes in laws, state agents (as was the 
case with the French ministers) almost didn´t talk about the matter, and the leading 
newspapers seldom established the link between migration affairs and the attacks of 9/11.18 
Put another way, the French state has traditionally had a restrictive migration policy, but 
this has been so since before the terrorist attacks in New York. 
 By contrast, an example like 9/11 has been manipulated to “securitize” migration 
policies in the United States. Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer have shown that in the US, 
from 2001, there has been an explicit effort to link the migration issue with ideas of threats 
to national security. According to these authors, this is something that has been repeatedly 
affirmed in official speeches and documents like 2004´s National Border Patrol Strategy, 
or in the discussion in Congress in the context of 2002´s Homeland Security Act.19 By this 
logic, “any illegal entry could be a terrorist.”20 
 This rhetoric, so these authors point out, has had concrete consequences through the 
creation of new institutions and special norms, and through a constant increase in the 
budget and the number of agents deployed to control international immigration. Evidence 
of this, according to Isacson and Meyer, is the 2002 creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security which joins together distinct agencies connected with border security, 
and the 2005 commencement of the Secure Border Initiative to reinforce the security of the 
border. Between 1992 and 2011, they observe, the number of agents of the Border Patrol at 
the south-west border quintupled. And the total budget of the Border Patrol increased by 
102% from 2005.21 
 This is a very brief survey of the emergence of the theory of securitization, of its 
basic arguments and its use to explain, with greater or less success, what happens in 
practice in the sphere of international migration. I do not seek here to go any deeper into 
this theory. The point for now is to understand the source of the ideas and theoretical 
concepts that activists and experts collectively use when they try to explain what is 
happening in Mexico with international migration. Can it be said that the concept of 
securitization used to illustrate what happens in countries like the United States is of use in 
explaining “the humanitarian tragedy” of the migrants who cross through Mexico? How 
have those who affirm that the migration policy in Mexico is securitized demonstrated it? 
The following sections turn to these questions. 
 
 
The answer that explains everything: “securitization” 
To understand how activists, NGOs and some academics interpret what is happening with 
the migrants in Mexico, the departure point is to explore what their publications say. Upon 
reviewing a significant number of these texts, it is easy to find that the majority of them 
coincide in their diagnosis: the deplorable situation of the migrants in the country is the 
result of what they call “securitization.”22 Upon advancing in the analysis of these texts, it 
is evident that this concept has served to explain almost everything: the abandoning of a 
law (or the creating of another); the increase in the number of “operations” to carry out 
“migration checks,” but the reduction of migrants “detained” and “returned”; new 
dispositions on migration contrived by the federal government, along with their 
implementation (and manipulation) in the local sphere; the participation of organized crime 
in the field of migration; migration policies that occurred twenty, ten or three years since—
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and changes in the migration norms and practices that perhaps may come about in the 
future. 
 But what is securitization? Based upon the texts consulted, the concept brings 
together three central ideas. First: that the Mexican state deals with undocumented 
migration as an issue strictly of national security and that it has deployed certain specific 
policies for this. Second: that this is a policy that commenced after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 2001 in the United States and that it was “imposed” on Mexico. Third: that it—and 
only it—explains the increase in the violations of the human rights of the migrants. 
The aforesaid may be illustrated by four examples. In the introduction that he wrote 
for a text published by an NGO, the scholar Manuel Ángel Castillo explains securitization 
in the following manner: “the incidents of September 2001 in United States territory led to” 
the promotion of “initiatives tending to confront … threats” to “national security”. This 
affected “the manner of confronting the migration dynamic,” not only in the United States 
but also in its “immediate area of influence”–that is, in Mexico.23 
In Seguridad para el migrante: una agenda por construir, the authors propose that 
“the policy of the United States fosters the perception that migrants are a threat to national 
security.” The “imposition” of this view of migration in countries like Mexico, they affirm, 
leads undocumented migrants to be a concern within “the agenda of the fight against 
terrorism.”24 And this, they conclude, is one of “the central causes on account of which a 
situation of humanitarian crisis is currently being lived in the migration issue.”25 
 The topic is tackled in a similar way in the book Migración y seguridad: nuevo 
desafío en México: “starting from the attacks of 11 September 2001, migration has 
occupied an ever more outstanding place in security policies, on the argument of preventing 
the entry of possible terrorists. This process of securitizing migration … has had influence 
in other countries, as is the case with Mexico.”26  
Finally, according to the document Situación de los derechos humanos de las 
personas migrantes y solicitantes de asilo detenidas en las estaciones migratorias de 
México, “the repressive model” of migration control has been promoted by the United 
States “strongly through the last years.” 27 Hence Mexico´s migration policy, the authors 
affirm, “has had as its fundamental engine the interest in guarding the security of the 
Mexican state from the—unfounded—danger that foreign persons represent.”28 
 Thus far does the apparent consensus among experts and activists trying to explain 
the situation of transit migration in Mexico based upon securitization reach. The 
interpretation and use of this concept, however, changes from one text to another when the 
authors attempt to deepen their analyses. That is, upon thoroughly studying the arguments 
of the texts consulted on the securitization of migration in Mexico there appear a series of 
contradictions of which I underline three that are, in my opinion, fundamental. 
 
Securitization is and will always be 
The first transformation the concept undergoes has to do with its temporal origin. 
Securitization as a migration discourse and practice, so activists and experts say, arose 
starting from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States (9/11). 
However, when they go deeper into the analysis of the situation of migrants in Mexico, 
these same activists talk of securitization as an atemporal phenomemon that explains the 
migration policies in the 1990s (a decade before 2001) or those migration practices 
deployed since 2011 (a decade after). 
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 For instance, securitization supposedly serves to easily explain what has happened 
in Mexico “during the last two decades” (that is, from the 1990s)29; “in the current era and 
especially since September 2001.”30 Others, following the idea that securitization started 
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, indicate a crucial example of it in “Plan Sur,” 
implemented by the Mexican government in 2001 with “a police and inquisitorial focus,” 
and that “oriented migration policy to augment the capacity to guard against, control, 
inspect and contain the migratory flows.”31 The problem is that Plan Sur, as other experts 
observe, began in July 2001, that is, some two months before the attacks of 11 September.32 
 For others, securitization can explain any migration law or practice that has taken 
place in Mexico in the last ten years: in 2002, through the forming of the High Level Group 
on Border Security33; in 2007, through the mention of the migration issue in the National 
Development Plan´s section concerning national security34; in 2010, through the “formal” 
delegation of the capacity to carry out migration operations to the regional agents of the 
National Migration Institute; or in 2011, through the coming into force of the Migration 
Law which mentions the topic of national security. 
 
Securitization is the origin of everything 
The second transformation the concept of securitization undergoes on being used by experts 
and activists to explain the Mexican case is that of its supposed effects in migration policy 
and practice. Originally, the idea of securitization assumes a discourse based on the 
definition of migrants as a prominent threat to national security. This implies the 
deployment of migration norms, laws, rules, institutions, authorities and practices to control 
this potential danger to security. In Mexico, securitization serves for the experts to 
interpret–today–norms, laws and practices that currently limit the trans-migrants´ human 
rights, even though the said dispositions have existed in the country at least since 1974, or 
even since 1930. For some authors, it is only owing to securitization that we can understand 
“the applicability of norms and practices of migration control and inspection that restrict 
the human rights of migrants.”35 And yet, how to explain that exactly the same dispositions 
functioned in the country since before 11 September 2001? For instance, the power of the 
authorities to detain migrants unable to prove their legal stay in the country or to establish 
prison-like detention centers where migrants are deprived of their freedom.36 
Securitization has been useful to talk of the deployment of practices that even run 
counter to each other. For example, it serves to approach, at the same time, the 
consequences of the excess and absence of border control–depending on which expert 
considers there to be excess or absence of border control. The authors who believe that the 
government has been inefficient in border control think this has forced the authorities to 
increase the number of raids and “migration filters” within the country, outside of 
international entry points. And “where there are greater [migration] controls, greater are the 
risks facing persons all along the migration circuit, because migrants have to fall back on 
the trafficking networks that are today controlled by organized crime networks.”37 By 
contrast, those who think that there has been greater border control consider that this has 
“involved negligence in the effective control of the transit routes.”38 And this negligence in 
the transit routes, in turn, has brought greater abuses against the migrants, as there are no 
authorities to protect them from organized crime.39 How can securitization serve to support 
opposing explanations? 
 
Securitization was imposed by the United States, although really it doesn´t matter 
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The final distortion of the concept has to do with its origin. The consensus among experts 
and activists is that securitization was imposed on Mexico by the United States after 11 
September 2001. This is an explanation that is believable but difficult to demonstrate.  “I do 
not know for a fact if there were pressures or open demands from the United States to 
exercise a greater control by the Mexican authorities in the southern border,” affirms 
Natalia Armijo.40 The same is also admitted by Manuel Ángel Castillo and Mónica 
Toussaint: “it is difficult to prove the influence of the United States policy of national 
security in the rise of the mechanisms of migration control in the southern border of 
Mexico.”41 For these authors, the really important thing is that “starting from September 
2001 there were significant changes that had implications for [the migration] policies and 
measures.” In equal fashion for Adam Isacson “Mexico has increased its securitization 
efforts along its border with the United States.” However, Isacson observes, “clearly” those 
securitization efforts have been carried out by Mexico “whether encouraged by the United 
States or not.”42 Thus, the irony is that the authors who affirm that securitization is 
something “imposed” on Mexico from the United States are exactly the same who then 
warn that this cannot be demonstrated, or really doesn´t matter. 
 In sum, upon reviewing a significant number of texts that talk about the situation of 
international migration in Mexico it is plain that “securitization” is a concept fully evoked 
and shared by activists and experts. With variations and nuances, the majority of the texts 
coincide on three basic components: that the Mexican state strictly considers international 
migration a problem of national security and that it acts in consequence through public 
norms and policies; that it is a view imposed from the Unites States that began immediately 
after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001; and that this explains “the humanitarian 
tragedy” of the migrants in transit through Mexico. None the less, in using this concept in 
their analyses, the authors as a matter of fact end up passing over these three factors. These 
texts produce the sensation that securitization has turned into less an explanation than “a 
dogma of faith”--an idea that frequently shows up in the rhetoric of the activists, that is 
easily believable, that appears to explain with certain simplicity what is happening (and 
what is not) with undocumented migration in Mexico, but that almost nobody really knows 
what is. 
 
 
Migration control in Mexico: the available evidence 
To be able to talk about securitization in Mexico, the evidence presented by activists and 
experts ought to permit us to find three elements in the discourse and practice of the 
government. First: the notion that migration represents an existential threat to the security 
of the state and society. Second: the pre-eminence given in speeches and laws to migration 
as a threat to security. Third: the political and institutional effects of these ideas, which 
ought to have brought substantive changes in praxis: for instance, greater budgets, more 
immigration agents.43 To know if these elements are present in the Mexican case, I shall 
take the examples and evidence that the same activists and experts normally use when they 
argue that migration in Mexico has been securitized. 
 
Securitization in official discourse? 
In Mexico, activists and experts affirm that migration is securitized. However, they do not 
offer examples of how this occurs in government rhetoric. In the texts consulted for this 
article it was not possible to find examples of speeches or at least key phrases pronounced 
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during the terms of Presidents Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), Vicente Fox (2000-2006) or 
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) that explicitly linked transit migration with security, or that 
represented migrants as threat to Mexico’s security. 
 This allows it to be inferred that the supposed securitization of international 
migration in Mexico is not present, at least, in official discourse. Neither the Presidents nor 
their Secretaries of State, for example, are talking about migrants in transit as a danger for 
the country´s security. At least not until before 2012. 
 
Securitization in legal dispositions? 
An example frequently cited by the NGOs that seek to demonstrate that migration has been 
securitized in Mexican norms and laws is the National Development Plan, the Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo (PND) of 2007-2012. This is due to its having “fused migration 
and national security,” as the activists affirm.44 
 In effect, the PND´s section on “national security” mentions the migration theme: “a 
fundamental condition in the policy of national security consists in guaranteeing the order 
and legality of the migratory and commercial flows, or flows of any type, in the more than 
4,300 kilometers that comprise our borders.”45 This is the only time that the theme of 
migration is explicitly linked to national security. But this is what any state seeks to attain, 
as a matter of principle. Like any other sovereign country, Mexico has tried to control 
migratory and commercial flows and its borders since its independence, and it is not for this 
that anyone talked about securitization or policies imposed by the United States 
immediately after 9/11.  
The PND´s section on national security also talks of border control and again 
mentions migrants. However, in doing so it does not refer to them as a threat, nor does it 
represent them as undesirable or dangerous actors. To the contrary, it talks of “safeguarding 
security on the borders, along with the integrity and respect for the human rights both of the 
inhabitants of these zones and of migrants.”46 It affirms that “the strategies of border 
security should focus on the protection of migrants,” for being exposed to “groups of 
smugglers and traffickers in people and drugs.” 
 But there is another section of the PND that mentioned the migration theme: 
Effective Democracy and Responsible Foreign Policy.47 There it was affirmed that the 
government was seeking “the protection of Latin American citizens who enter the country, 
often in an undocumented manner and in deplorable security conditions.”48 It even 
proposed “building a new culture of migration” that would promote “the co-responsibility 
between the countries that share with Mexico migration flows to foster economic growth 
and social development in the most underdeveloped zones, and guarantee at the same time 
the protection of the rights of the migrants …”49 Is this securitization? 
Neither the Mexican Constitution nor the Law of National Security present a link 
between migration and security. So it is from a very secondary norm that the texts here 
consulted cite another example to try to demonstrate the securitization of migration—the 
Accord recognizing the National Institute of Migration, the Instituto Nacional de Migración 
(INM) as a national security agency.50 Yet, while this is a frequently evoked example the 
authors who analyze the reasons why this disposition contributes to securitization are rare. 
 The main question that ought to be posed is how the formal identification of the 
INM as one of the multiple national security agencies was justified. The presidential decree 
giving rise to this disposition maintains that the laws in the framework for the INM have 
always been related with the country´s security.51 The INM can, for example, restrict the 
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emigration of Mexicans when “national interest so demands”; guard the entry and departure 
of Mexicans (and foreigners), and check their documentation. Are these functions imposed 
by the Unites States on the Mexican government after 9/11? Were they designed with the 
objective of controlling the Central American migrants who are represented as a threat to 
security? In reality, these are dispositions that the INM has since its creation; functions that 
in distinct forms have always been in Mexican legislation.52 Besides, these measures 
equally affect Mexicans and non-Mexicans. 
A last example is the Ley de Migración of 2011. In effect, this law mentions in its 
first article that it seeks “the preservation of national sovereignty and security,” although it 
never establishes how it is going to contribute to this or what is understood by security. 
Furthermore, the law affirms that it seeks “the respect for, protection and safeguarding of 
the human rights” of migrants.53  In any case, the relation between security and 
migration in this law is not something new. As José A. Guevara correctly points out, this 
link has been present in the legal statutes in Mexico from the beginning of the 19th century. 
Thus, the 2011 law merely consolidates the views of migration and security that already 
existed in previous pieces of legislation: for example, in the Law on the faculties of the 
Government relative to the expulsion of non-naturalized foreigners of 1832, in the Law on 
aliens and naturalization of 1886, in the Law of Immigration of 1909, in the Law of 
Migration of 1930, or in the General Law of Population of 1974.54 
 The meticulous review by Guevara of Mexican migration norms thus reveals that 
the problem is not securitization, that the link between security and migration has always 
existed in Mexico, and that therefore it has not been imposed by the United States. 
Guevara´s study demonstrates that the problem--perhaps more disturbing--is xenophobia 
and racism, the pillars that have historically framed the link between international 
migration and security in the country.55 
 
Securitization in practice? 
For some activists, the administrative detention of migrants unable to prove their legal stay 
in Mexico demonstrates that migration is securitized.56 The Migration Law of 2011 
contemplates, for example, “presentation”--the peculiar term employed in the law to 
indicate that a migrant can be detained for no more than 36 hours. It also establishes 
“lodging”57—the euphemism used to refer to the detention of migrants from between 15 
and 60 days in “migration stations,” which in their turn are the name given for the prison-
like centers where migrants find themselves detained.58 
 However, these dispositions did not start in 2001 after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
nor have they been justified before the public with the argument that migrants are a threat 
to national security. These measures have existed since at least 1974, for so the General 
Law of Population established them. This law empowered the Ministry of the Interior to 
establish “migration stations” in places considered appropriate “to lodge” migrants.59 The 
said law did indeed criminalize the foreigners who settled without documents in the 
country, providing for this case a sentence of up to two years in prison.60 
 For other activists a second proof of securitization in practice is related to the 
mechanisms by which certain authorities besiege migrants within the country, in places 
distinct from the internment points.61 For this, The Migration Law of 2011 uses three terms: 
“control,” “verification” and “migration revision.”62 
 Despite the questionable–and perhaps unconstitutional–nature these measures may 
have, they were not designed as a response to the attacks of 9/11. The harassment of 
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migrants has been authorized by law for at least three decades. For example, the General 
Law of Population of 1974 granted discretionary powers to the Ministry of the Interior to 
promote before other federal or local authorities measures “to subject the immigration of 
foreigners to the forms it judges appropriate, and to procure the best assimilation of these to 
the national setting and their adequate arrangement in the territory.”63 Since 1999, the law 
empowered the authorities to undertake “verification visits outside the established fixed 
revision points,” and “migration revision on routes or provisional points distinct from those 
established.”64 These measures, moreover, affect both foreigners with documents and 
Mexicans. Furthermore, these migration “controls” would appear to be rather inefficient, 
according to official data. The number of Central American migrants detained and expelled 
by Mexico gradually diminished between 2005 and 2010. In 2005, Mexico detained and 
expelled 223,000 Central American trans-migrants, while less than 64,000 in 2010.65 
 Thus, one of the arguments of the civil society organizations to prove that in Mexico 
migration is securitized in practice refers to the INM´s capacity to undertake “operations” 
with the end of detaining undocumented migrants. However, despite the deployment of 
“operations” there were less migrants “retained” and “returned.” Between 2005 and 2010, 
there was a decrease of 72% in the number of Central American migrants detained and 
expelled by Mexico. In contrast, in the United States, in exactly the same period, there was 
an increase of 89% in the number of Central American migrants returned to their 
countries.66 That is, in the United States the figures match with the policy of securitization: 
there is a discourse that represents migrants as a threat, more restrictive rules and practices, 
more people detained and deported every year. In Mexico exactly the contrary occurs: there 
is not an official discourse on securitization; the “operations” that supposedly demonstrate 
securitization in practice have existed for decades; and there were less people detained and 
expelled between 2005 and 2010 according to the available official information. 
 A third argument to demonstrate that in Mexico migration policy “has securitization 
as its cornerstone” is related to the participation of security agents distinct from the 
personnel of the INM in the migration “control”: for example, the Federal Police.67 
However, this questionable disposition has existed in the country since 1930. The 
Migration Law of that year authorized the migration authorities to solicit the aid of the 
public forces, federal or local, to carry out their tasks.68 Something similar was ordered by 
the General Law of Population of 1999: “the Ministry of the Interior, through the personnel 
of the migration services and the Preventive Federal Police, shall be able to carry out … 
verification visits” and “migration revision on routes or provisional points distinct from 
those established.”69 
 Finally, the evolution of the INM´s budget does not follow a coherent pattern. What 
can be known is that it has not substantially increased. Between 2005 and 2011, it could be 
said that the resources approved for the INM in the federal budget of expenditure did not go 
up in a significant way because they did not go up on average more than 20% in all those 
years.70 In 2008, seven years after 9/11, the budget suddenly increased 90%. However, in 
2009 the resources went down 14%. Can the budget cut also be explained by securitization? 
Since then and until 2012, it remained constant. 
 
The insufficiencies of the discourse of securitization 
Despite the lack empirical evidence, the idea that Mexico’s migration policy is securitized 
has become a commonplace among many of the activists connected with the migration 
issue. We could believe that the explanation of securitization, like a dogma of faith, is a 
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truth that does not admit doubts and that, therefore, does not require evidence to be 
believed. The problem is that the way experts and activists have adapted the concept of 
securitization in Mexico presents some problems. 
 
Immutable and pure 
The first weakness of the texts that explain the situation of international migration in 
Mexico through the theory of securitization is that they assume that the migration policy is 
immutable: that is, that it does not change with the passing of times. This allows the 
activists to explain events that happened in 2011, 2001 or 1990; and to predict situations 
that may occur in the future. As if the migration policy and its management were identical 
in the governments of Presidents Salinas and Calderón. As if the civil society organizations 
that promote and defend the human rights of migrants were today equal to those of the 
1980s. 
 Immutability brings with it another weakness: the fantasy of purity. That is, the texts 
here consulted talk of securitization as something that is foreign to its historical, social, 
political or economic context. Securitization as a state policy passes across the years 
without seeing itself affected by economic squeezes, political instability, crises of violence, 
migratory flows or the work of civil society organizations or transnational lobbying 
networks. It walks on without getting dirty. Securitization would appear not to vary in 
intensity. Is there some change in the level of securitization of migration practice between 
the Law of Population of 1974 and the Law of 2011? 
 
Beyond the state 
One of the most serious insufficiencies of the securitization discourse of the activists and 
experts is that it ignores a multiplicity of elements that make possible the suffering and 
abuses that foreign citizens without documents in transit through the country systematically 
endure. The discourse of securitization concentrates on the performance of the state and its 
agents, along with the effects of restrictive laws that these design and implement. It 
implicitly assumes that upon the disappearance of securitization in the migration policy that 
has been imposed by the United States the situation of the undocumented foreigners in 
Mexico will improve. However, this overlooks that “the humanitarian tragedy” of the 
migrants in transit is also the result of other factors, some structural, others conjunctional, 
that have nothing to do with the supposed securitization nor with the state: for example, 
xenophobia and racism71; the fact that the kidnapping of transmigrants and what comes 
with it – extortion, torture, murder, disappearance – is a lucrative business for broad sectors 
of the population in Mexico72; the fact that criminal organizations are exploring new illegal 
markets (mass kidnappings). 
 
Conclusion 
A significant number of activists and experts found in securitization an argument 
apparently explaining with ease everything that happens to the migrants in transit in 
Mexico. And yet, all define what securitization is in a different and at times contradictory 
way; and almost always without proofs. What are we talking about when we talk about the 
securitization of international migration in Mexico? 
The securitization that affects the migration policy and management in other 
countries has entailed three things: the public and extensive notion that undocumented 
migrants are a risk to security; the pre-eminence given in speeches and legal dispositions to 
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migration as a threat; the materializing of policies and institutions designed to detain the 
danger that migrants represent. The adoption and adaptation of the theory of securitization 
on the part of many activists and experts who seek to explain what is happening in Mexico 
has involved three assumptions: that the government treats migration as an issue 
exclusively of security and that on account of this it has implemented restrictive policies; 
that this policy commenced after the attacks of 2001 in the United States and was 
“imposed” on Mexico; that it alone explains the rise in the abuses against migrants. 
 However, these same authors have not provided convincing evidence to demonstrate 
that this occurs. There are no traces of an official discourse that explicitly portrays migrants 
as a potential threat to national security. By contrast with what happens in countries like the 
United States, in Mexico government rhetoric talks, ironically, of “protecting” migrants and 
of “respecting” their human rights. Not all dispositions that currently serve to control 
international migration–“revisions,” “lodgings,” “operations”– are necessarily more 
restrictive than in the past. Moreover, the majority of the dispositions have existed for 
decades; that is, they do not appear to have been “imposed” recently by the United States 
after the attacks of 9/11. 
 Beyond the absence of evidence, the argument of securitization is founded on 
assumptions that are not totally correct. For example, it assumes that migration 
dispositions, policies and management in Mexico are immutable, detached from their 
political, historical or social context. To claim that everything that happens with 
undocumented migrants can be understood with securitization obscures another type of 
more ranging explanations: the multiplication of criminal groups, the indifference of 
Mexican society to the drama of Central American migration, the fact that undocumented 
migration means great business for wide sectors of the population, the limited capacity of 
the language of human rights to represent the suffering that is not only caused by the state 
but also by ordinary Mexicans. 
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